Ownership and wages: Spatial econometric approach by Ogorevc, Marko & Verbič, Miroslav
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ownership and wages: Spatial
econometric approach
Marko Ogorevc and Miroslav Verbicˇ
University of Ljubljana, Institute for Economic Research Ljubljana
May 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38915/
MPRA Paper No. 38915, posted 21 May 2012 02:54 UTC
Ownership and wages: Spatial econometric approach 
 
Marko Ogorevc 
Institute for Economic Research 
Kardeljeva pl. 17 
1000 Ljubljana 
Slovenia 
E-mail: ogorevcm@ier.si 
 
Miroslav Verbič 
Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana 
Kardeljeva pl. 17 
1000 Ljubljana 
Slovenia 
E-mail: miroslav.verbic@guest.arnes.si 
 
 
Abstract: The aim of our paper is to disentangle the relationship between ownership and 
wages using cross-section data for Slovenian medium size and large companies, where we 
account for spatial dependencies in wage determination. Space here is not considered in 
geographical context, but as a set of relations between firms originating from the same owner. 
Using a detailed database on Slovenian ownership, we apply a spatial econometric approach 
to detect any ownership-based wage spillovers, while accounting for different standard 
factors, such as size, capital intensity and productivity, and also some ownership-based 
variables, such as ownership concentration and ratio of cash-flow to control rights. Our results 
indicate that ownership is an important factor in explaining differences in wage levels. Many 
large owners divert cash-flow into their own pockets which has a detrimental effect on wages 
and indicates that this behaviour induced by owners is not sustainable. 
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1. Introduction 
“In theory, the ownership of a business in a capitalist economy is irrelevant. In practice, it is 
often controversial« (The Economist, 2010). Economists have long neglected the ownership 
of corporations in their empirical work, mostly due to the lack of precise data on ownership 
structure and the lack of an appropriate method to incorporate it in the empirical work. 
Although some attempts are found in the literature, most of them try to a priori group capital 
owners into specific groups such as state, domestic, and foreign ownership. If however we 
assume that these groups are not homogeneous at all, it is not surprising that no proper 
conclusion has been made.  In this paper we try to overcome these problems by introducing a 
connectivity of firms on the basis of ownership. Ownership of each firm is traced to 
individuals where possible and tested whether firms with same owners perform similarly with 
regards to wages.  
Differences in wages are results of different factors usually associated with economic and 
institutional environment. Wage gaps have been intensively studied by Buckley and 
Enderwick (1983), Blanchflower (1984), Globerman et al. (1994), Oulton (1998), Feliciano 
and Lipsey (1999),  Girma et al. (2001), Gosh (2009). The main factor in these studies was 
labour productivity (Buckley and Enderwick, 1983). Due to technological factors, companies 
employing highly skilled and educated labour force would thus pay relatively higher wages 
compared to low tech firms, which are usually differences between foreign and domestic 
firms (Doms and Jensen, 1998). Better technology translates higher productivity into higher 
wages. This line of reasoning is in line with neoclassical theory, which argues that higher 
wages signal better firm performance (Winter-Ember and Zweimüller, 1999). 
On the other hand, wage increases stimulate workers to produce more (i.e. raise labour 
productivity). While technology is difficult to measure, capital intensity according to 
Globerman et al. (1994) and Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) is another factor which contributes 
to explaining wage gaps between foreign and domestic firms, because lower wages might 
reduce employment. Globerman et al. (1994), after controlling for capital intensity and firm 
size, find that differences in wages associated with ownership disappear, which is additionally 
confirmed by Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) on the US manufacturing sector.  
For the purposes of studying effects of ownership on corporate policies we introduce a capital 
connectivity matrix, which is based on direct and indirect ownership shares in Slovenian 
medium size and large corporations. With the use of spatial econometric tools we try to 
answer the question of relevance of ownership, by looking at the similarities between firms 
that are owned by the same individual. Our hypothesis is that different (individual) owners 
have different effects on wage levels in firms. We test this hypothesis via spatial error model 
and expect a positive spatial autocorrelation coefficient. This implies that differences in wages 
are not a sole result of differences in productivity, capital intensity, and size, but are 
additionally set by the owners of the firms.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature on ownership and wages. In Section 3 we introduce basic elements of spatial 
econometrics. Capital connectivity matrix, which uses information on individuals’ direct and 
indirect ownership shares, is presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains results of spatial 
regression, with concluding remarks in Section 6.   
2. Ownership and wages 
The main factor producing the wage gap is productivity, which is a consequence of higher 
skilled labour force, working in high-tech firms and, according to the existing literature, is not 
associated with ownership but rather with factor intensity and firm size. On the other hand 
some authors have found that there is some linkage between ownership and corporate wage 
policy, since changes in ownership structure are accompanied with important consequences 
for corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Effects of ownership concentration on 
firm performance have its roots in contributions from Berle and Means (1932). Although 
empirical studies have shown, that higher ownership concentration, measured as a share of 
largest blockholder, has a positive effect on performance (Cubbin and Leech, 1983), there was 
no theoretical background at the time for such findings. Demsetz (1983) argued that 
ownership structure is an endogenous result of competitive selection with a single goal of 
profit maximization expected by their owners; hence changes in ownership structure cannot 
affect firm performance. Accordingly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) could not confirm any 
relationship between concentration and performance in US corporations.  
Modern theory of corporate governance has evolved from earlier workings of Berle and 
Means (1932), with its pillars in dispersed ownership, which is well seen in the Theory of the 
Firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and in contribution from Grossman and Hart (1980). 
Unique institutional environment (Roe, 1994; La Porta et al., 1997) that gave ground to the 
theory of a firm has its’ origins from English speaking countries such as US and GB. This 
uniqueness of institutional environment provides a rather dispersed ownership structure, 
meaning that ownership concentration is low and portfolio investors play a large role. Such 
factors are rarely found in the rest of the world where investor protection is low, ownership 
concentration high, which in turn makes identity of large owners (blockholders) an important 
factor.  
At that time the empirical validity of dispersed ownership with strong managers and weak 
owners (Roe, 1994) view was being questioned by authors such as Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz 
(1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988), Morck et al. (1988), La Porta et al. (1999), who have shown that even in US 
corporations there exists a moderate ownership concentration, while in the developing 
countries ownership is even more concentrated  (La Porta et al., 1999). Shareholders in those 
countries have significant shares, which they use to actively influence corporate governance 
(Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). Active owners contradict Bearle-Means thesis as well as Roe’s 
view on weak owners. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that identifying ultimate owners and 
associated voting rights is the only way to reveal the relationship between ownership and 
control. Controlling shareholders, who are often either state or a family, are present in most of 
corporations and their control rights exceed cash-flow rights. A “better” ratio of cash-flow to 
control rights is most often achieved through pyramid structure based on the theory of 
pyramidal ownership and family business groups (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006), and with 
participation in management (La Porta et al., 1999). Better ratio of cash-flow to control rights, 
gained through pyramid structure, allows controlling shareholder to divert cash-flow to their 
own pockets. 
3. Brief introduction to spatial econometrics 
Shareholders, either large or small, are not randomly (and independently) distributed, since 
they can choose where to invest. According to their share they have voting rights, which they 
might influence firms’ governance. Thus we can assume that firms are not independent units. 
According to Kmenta (1997) independence is the most unreasonable assumption in many 
cross-section studies. Maddala (2001), while studying households, further explains that 
residuals can be spatially correlated most likely due to omitted variable. Spatial correlation 
implies existence of similar value in the neighbouring units. The first law of geography says 
that “everything is correlated with everything else, but close things are more correlated than 
things that are far away” (Tobler, 1970). 
 
In Euclidian space neighbourhood is defined with a distance measure: 
       (1) 
where dij is a distance between points si and sj. Most used definitions of neighbourhood are 
critical distance and n-nearest neighbours. Critical distance defines two points in space as 
neighbours if their distance is less than some cut-off distance .  According to this definition 
points si and sj are said to be neighbours if . Usally cut-off distance is defined as 
 in order that each point has at least one neighbour. Similarly, two 
points are said to be nearest neighbours if , where k is an arbitrary 
integer number referring to the number of nearest neighbours.  
With distance (d) and neighbourhood (N) properly defined, we can introduce a key concept of 
spatial econometrics, the spatial weights matrix (also known as a spatial connectivity matrix 
or W-matrix), which formally defines relationships between all points. Elements of a W-
matrix are defined as: 
       (2) 
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After defining a W-matrix, it is usual practice to standardize it in order to confine a coefficient 
of spatial correlation to (-1,1) parameter space. A family of standardization techniques is 
defined as (Tiefelsdorf and Griffith, 2006): 
          (3) 
where B is binary spatial weight (1 for neighbours and 0 otherwise), Dq matrix with spatial 
weights elements, diq, n number of units, and q an element defining standardization. Some of 
the most common ways of standardization are (Patuelli et al., 2006): 
i. Q = 0. C-scheme or globally standardized spatial weights matrix is used when there 
are large differences in connectivity (different number of neighbours) between units 
and these need to be expressed. C-scheme also makes W-matrix symmetrical. 
ii. Q = -1. W-scheme or row standardized spatial weights matrix is most common and has 
an opposite effect to the C-scheme. It emphasizes points or areas with less 
connectivity at the edges of space. 
iii. Q = -0,5. S-scheme or variance stabilizing coding scheme (Tiefelsdorf et al., 1999) is 
right in between the first two, since it diminishes the differences with regards to 
connectivity. 
With W-matrix defined and standardized, we can now introduce spatial models. Most spatial 
models come in variety of Cliff-Ord type models (Cliff and Ord, 1981). On one hand such 
models incorporate spatial lag of the dependant variable, while on the other a spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals. Spatial lag model is defined as: 
 ,        (4)  
while spatial error model is defined as: 
.        (5) 
Combination of both spatial lag and spatial error produces the following SARAR model: 
       (6) 
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SARAR stands for Spatial AutoRegressive (lag) AutoRegressive (error) model. If we only 
take first order neighbour then we can write it as a SARAR(1,1). Accordingly we can rename 
spatial lag model as SARAR(1,0) and spatial error model as SARAR (0,1).  SARAR can be 
estimated with Feasible Generalized Spatial two-stage least squares (FGS2SLS), a procedure 
developed by Kelejian in Prucha (1997; 2007, 2010), which is a combination of GM and IV 
estimation.  
Although model (6) is well established in spatial econometrics literature, most regional 
scientist follow an approach, where they first estimate OLS regression and later try to 
determine whether the true data generating process is a spatial error, or a spatial lag model. 
Kalejian and Prucha (1998) believe that testing a joint hypothesis of no spatial spillovers 
originated from the endogenous variables or from the disturbances is superior, since model (6) 
allows for much richer spatial patterns. Even if corresponding spatial coefficients turn out not 
to be statistically different from zero, one could still estimate a reduced model (Piras, 2010)   
4. Capital connectivity matrix 
With basic elements of spatial econometrics defined, we move to the capital connectivity 
matrix. Before using real data, it’s best to present a simplified version of the ownership 
structure data. In Table 1 there are 4 firms and 3 owners, each firm with 2 owners (OA and 
OB) and their share of stock C. Since we do not deal with geographical space but a space 
where relationships between points are defined with ownership of capital, we named it 
“capital space”. 
Table 1: Example of the ownership data 
Firm OA OB CA CB 
1 1 2 C1 1-C1
2 2 3 C2 1-C2
3 3 1 C3 1-C3
4 2 1 C4 1-C4
Source: Ogorevc and Šlander Wostner, 2011 
 
In capital space a pair of firms are said to be neighbours if they have a common owner or in 
other words, if they are placed in the owners’ neighbourhood N(i). Elements of the matrix are 
defined as: 
 
.           (7) 
 
Where  denotes share of owner k in firm i and  denotes share of owner k in firm j. 
According to the Table 1 we can see that firm F1 has 4 relationships: two originating from 
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owner O1 and two from owner O2. Since firms F2 and F4 have the same owners (O1 and O2) 
we summed weights of a pair F(1,4) which lead to the following specification of the matrix.  
 
Table 2: Example of non-standardized capital W-matrix 
 F 1 2 3 4 
1 0 ω3 ω1 ω2 + ω4 
2 ω3 0 ω7 ω6 
3 ω1 ω7 0 ω10 
4 ω2 + ω4 ω6 ω10 0 
Source: Ogorevc and Šlander Wostner, 2011 
Using real data on ownership presents a difficult task, since we first need to calculate direct 
and indirect ownership shares for each individual owner. It is not uncommon to find the use 
cross-shareholdings, pyramid structures and other techniques to achieve a better ratio of cash-
flow to control rights and also to hide real ownership information. One such example is 
shown in Figure 1, which reveals the ownership structure of joint stock company Alukomen 
d.d. On the first level of ownership structure (direct ownership) we can see that there is a 
majority stockholder Alumen montal d.d. with 76.11% of shares. Second largest owner with 
less than 1% is an individual and same goes for the third and so forth. We can say that 
Alukomen d.d. is controlled by Alukomen Montal d.d. On the second level we can see that the 
largest shareholder (blockholder) of Alukomen d.d. is Kraški zidar d.d. with 11.11%, 
followed by the company itself with nearly 10% and also a cross-shareholding by Alukomen 
d.d with 8.6% ownership. Other shareholders are Fin Impex d.o.o., owned by individual X1 
with 7.64% and Primorje d.d., owned by Primorje holding d.d., for which ownership structure 
information was not available. 
In order to calculate direct and indirect ownership shares we used two databases. First one 
contained ownership information of Slovenian joint stock companies with information limited 
to those, who traded at least one share. Ownership data for joint stock companies was 
provided by the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (KDD) for the top 50 holders at the 
end of the march 2009. For limited liability companies we used Business register of Slovenia 
(PRS) provided by AJPES. Although PRS contained ownership information for a longer time 
period, we matched it to coincide with a date of KDD top 50 data.  
Procedure for calculating direct and indirect ownership shares was a four-step routine with 
iteration of the final step, while at each step limiting the number of owners to 50 in order to 
reduce computation time: 
i. First step was used to obtain direct ownership shares of companies; which is the case 
for first level (direct) ownership in Figure 1.  
ii. In the second step all owners that are limited liability companies were replaced by 
their owners in order to obtain individuals, joint stock companies or foreign firms for 
which we did not have data on ownership structure. Looking again at Figure 1, Fin 
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Impex d.o.o. was replaced by individual X1 and Ograd holding d.o.o was replaced by 
individual X2, X3 and so on.  
iii. The third step was similar to the second but this time all the direct owners of joint 
stock companies were replaced by their owners. 
iv. The goal of the final step was to account for cross-shareholdings and for companies 
holding their own stock. Again, looking at Figure 1, since Alumen montal d.d. has its’ 
own shares, they were replaced by the owners of Alumen montal d.d. This was done 
iteratively for as long as the Alumen montal d.d. remain its own shareholder above 
0.00001%. At the third step of the procedure Alumen montal d.d. had 9.96% of its 
own share. Starting the forth step, it share was diminishing from 0.0099% then 
0.000098%, 0.000000009%, at which time the iteration procedure would stop and 
changing that number of ownership share to 0.  
 
Figure 1: Ownership structure of Alukomen d.d. 
 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
In the case of illustrative example from Figure 1, combined direct and indirect ownership 
shares reveal the following top five owners (in Table 3). Based on this information we 
computed ratio of cash-flow to control rights by comparing the control rights of direct owners 
to cash-flow rights of largest indirect owners. Computation of the ownership concentration 
measure (C4) was done by summing the top four owners’ shares. Again, due to data limitation 
both measures are imprecise since we did not have all the necessary information on ownership 
for some corporations. Many of these corporations, which are large shareholders, were treated 
as a single individual (e.g. Primorje holding d.d.).  
Table 3: Top 5 owners of Alukomen d.d. 
Individual X1 Primorje holding d.d. Individual Y4 Individual X2 Individual X3 
6.78% 5.46% 5.36% 4.90% 3.93% 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
Combination of direct and indirect ownership shares were then used to produce a capital W-
matrix. Using an example data from table 1 we have shown, that elements were computed 
using a product of ownership shares while accounting for the ownership information with 
summation of ownership shares in a given firm. For an easier overview of ownership structure 
of Slovenian medium size and large companies we present assets and labour cost multiplied 
by direct and indirect ownership shares for the first 10 largest owners in the sample, sorted by 
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labour costs. It can be seen from Table 4 that Slovenian state, with a portfolio of 280 
investments controls more than one third of all the assets in the economy’s medium size and 
large companies, while its share in labour costs is about a fifth. Due to sample restrictions or 
owners uniqueness these shares tend to be inflated in the sample and producing values for 
assets and labour 42% and 31% respectively. It should be mentioned here that municipality 
ownership is not included in the ownership by the Republic of Slovenia, although it is a part 
of the state ownership. Largest of the municipalities is Ljubljana with 1% both in assets and 
labour costs, while all municipalities combined control about 2% of assets and 3.5% of labour 
costs with 466 investments. Second largest owner measured by assets is a Slovene 
entrepreneur who controlled 2.3% of assets and 1% of labour costs. Ownership information 
for the rest of the top 10 list could not be traced to individuals due to database limitation.  
Table 4: Top 10 owners by labour costs in the sample 
  economy sample 
Name N Assets Labour costs Assets Labour costs 
R. Slovenia 280 33.84% 21.39% 41.85% 30.65% 
Ag Novartis pharma 4 1.70% 2.24% 2.12% 3.22% 
M. Ljubljana 14 0.97% 0.99% 1.21% 1.43% 
Center naložbe, d.d. 27 1.30% 0.92% 1.62% 1.31% 
Entrepreneur 9 2.30% 0.99% 2.70% 1.24% 
Primorje holding d.d. 33 0.84% 0.88% 0.91% 1.14% 
Dilon coöperatief u.a. 9 0.66% 0.66% 0.82% 0.95% 
Hidria, d.d. 12 0.49% 0.53% 0.61% 0.77% 
Siemens aktiengesellschaft 82 0.45% 0.52% 0.56% 0.75% 
Infond holding, d.d. 18 0.64% 0.46% 0.80% 0.66% 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
Another way of looking at ownership information is by drawing it on a two dimensional 
space. Figure 1 was drawn with software Pajek using Kamada-Kawai separate components 
technique (Kamada and Kawai, 1989), where distances between points represent capital 
spatial weights. Similar to the Table 4, we can observe a concentrated ownership in the 
middle of Figure 2 as a result of a state ownership. Points that are further out are indirectly 
less connected to the state’s portfolio than the ones in the inner circle, while the separate 
components present firms with no ownership ties with the state. The main insight of the 
Figure 2 compared to Table 4 is the finding, that the Slovenian government has potential 
control of the economy beyond what it can be seen from the Table 4. Namely only 63 firms in 
the sample are totally independent from the highly connected centre.  
Figure 2: Graphical representation of capital W-matrix 
 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
Standardization of capital W-matrix was a combination of row standardization (W) and 
variance stabilizing scheme (S). W-coding was first used in order to confine spatial 
correlation coefficients to (-1,1) parameter space. Using only this coding is problematic in the 
case of capital W-matrix since a pair of firms are said to be neighbours if they have a common 
owner. A problem of row standardization can be shown in the following example. Imagine we 
have only two pairs of neighbouring firms, each pair connected through a different owner and 
all other owners of the four firms are unique. Then suppose that owner of the first pair 
connection has a 100% share in both firms, while the owner of the second pair has only 5% 
share in one firm and 10% share in the other. Without any standardization the weights of the 
first pair would be 1 and only 0.005 for the second. Row-standardization in this case would 
lead to weights equality, which is not correct since change in the low shareholding pair would 
mean that only the non-unique owner can influence firms’ governance. For that reason we 
applied a correction factor, which is equal to the sum of non-unique owners’ shares in a given 
firm. Also, the correction factor was different in the (5%, 10%) pair, which made connectivity 
matrix asymmetric. Because of the use of the correction factor, parameter space was no longer 
confined to (-1,1) and for that reason amongst the others we used S-coding scheme in the 
second step. But why didn’t we use only S-coding? The answer to that lies in the varying size 
of portfolio of the owners. If we take two extremes; one owner has shares in 280 firms, while 
the other only in 2 and for ease of interpretation we assume that the two owners have each 
100% in all of their firms. Then the weights for the larger owner would be much higher than 
those of the smaller one. Using a combination of corrected row-standardized S-coding scheme 
thus confines spatial correlation parameters to (-1,1) while accounting for the information  
lost due to unique owners. 
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5. Empirical evidence 
The core of this study is to provide some empirical evidence on whether owners affect 
corporate policies in a detectable manner, in this case the corporate wage policy (or wage 
setting) using capital W-matrix and a simple statistical model with labour cost per worker as a 
dependant variable and a set of independent variables most commonly found in the literature. 
We present these variables in Table 5. 
Table 5: Definition of firm level variables 
Variable Code Definition AJPES CODE 
Labour cost per worker Lcost Total labour costs per 
month divided by average 
number of workers  
 
 
Labour productivity Lprod (Net sales minus costs of 
materials and services per 
month) divided by average 
number of workers  
 
Capital intensity Kint Capital stock divided by  
average number of 
workers 
 
Employment Empl Number of workers 
 
Profit margin PM Gross revenue divided by 
operating expenses  
Ownership 
concentration 
C4 Sum of top 4 owners  
Cash-flow to control 
rights ratio 
cf.cr Largest direct owner’s 
share divided by largest 
indirect owner’s share 
 
Regional average 
labour costs 
WREG Average labour costs in a 
statistical region 
 
Sector average labour 
costs 
WSKD Average NACE level 3 
labour costs 
 
Source: AJPES, 2011; own calculation 
Before starting with the estimation of spatial parameters, which are of prime interest to this 
study, we estimated the following OLS model and later tested for presence of spatial 
correlation using diagnostic test in form of Lagrange multiplier test.  
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Estimated model was in the following form: 
             (8) 
Table 6: Results of OLS model 
  Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept -3.909** 1.266 
Employment -0.027** 0.008 
Labour productivity 0.277*** 0.013 
Capital intensity 0.016*** 0.004 
Profit margin -0.292*** 0.051 
Cash-flow/control -0.031* 0.014 
Own. concentration -0.085*** 0.023 
Regional labour c. 0.813*** 0.178 
Sector labour c. 0.457*** 0.040 
n 798  
Se 0.204  
R2 0.605  
Adjusted R2 0.601  
F-statistic (p-value) 150.9 (0.000) 
 
Note: 
*** stat. sign. at the 0.1% level 
**stat. sign. at the 1% level 
*stat. sign. at. the 5% level 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
Labour costs are positively correlated with the average regional and sector labour costs. 
Similar result is shown for the labour productivity and capital intensity. Increase in labour 
productivity by 1% raises labour costs on average by 0.28%, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, contrary to the expectation employment has a small, yet negative effect, which is not in 
line with the theory, since larger firms are expected to pay higher wages. Surprisingly, profits 
are also found to have negative effects on wage levels. So the question that arises is whether 
higher profits are made at the expense of underpaid labour. If owners are highly indebted due 
to takeovers, reducing the average labour costs and thus increasing the profitability might 
explain the negative relationship. Since we do not have enough data to answer this question, 
profit-wage relationship remains unsolved while it still indicates that this behaviour induced 
by owners is not sustainable. However, other variables related to ownership seem to indicate 
just that. Higher ownership concentration reveals a negative correlation to average labour 
costs. Increase of ownership concentration by 1% reduces average labour costs by 0.085%, 
which is not in accordance to the Cubbin and Leech (1983), who found a positive relationship 
between concentration and firm performance. Apparently pyramid structures make it easier to 
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divert cash-flow from companies to owner’s pockets so it leaves less for the wages. 
Decreasing the ratio of cash-flow to control rights by 1% is accompanied by the increase of 
average labour costs by 0.031% on average, ceteris paribus. In light of these two findings of 
negative effect of both ownership related variables to wages, profit-wage relationship as 
found in Slovenian sample no longer appears contradictory.  
Testing for spatial correlation (Table 7) reveals that both residuals of OLS model and spatial 
lag of dependent variable are spatially correlated, meaning that we might expect similar 
values of both the dependent variable and disturbances in firms belonging to the same 
individual(s). This is a first indication in this study that ownership of a business does matter 
with regards to wages. Lagrange multiplier tests show that both lag of dependent variable as 
well as errors of OLS are spatially correlated, which signals that the data generating process 
takes a form of spatial error model. 
Table 7: LM tests 
  LM test 
SARAR(0,1) 20.402***
SARAR(1,0) 5.543* 
SARAR(1,1) 26.164***
 
Note: 
*** stat. sign. at the 0.1% level 
**stat. sign. at the 1% level 
*stat. sign. at. the 5% level 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
In the case of spatial lag model, OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent due to the 
simultaneity bias.  On the other hand, if the true data generating process is spatial error model, 
in which the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix determine the structure of spatial 
dependence, OLS will remain unbiased, yet inefficient, since estimators for standard errors 
will be biased in small samples. 
In Table 8 we present the results of SARAR models using spatial autocorrelation and 
heteroscedastic consistent estimator (FGS2SLS-HAC). Results were obtained using R 
software and the SPHET library (Piras, 2010).  
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Table 8: Results of spatial models 
 SARAR(1,0) SARAR(0,1) SARAR(1,1) 
 Estimate HAC St.Er. Estimate HAC St.Er. Estimate HAC St.Er.
Intercept -3.980** 1.387 -4.150** 1.467 -4.065** 1.459
Employment -0.032** 0.011 -0.032** 0.01 -0.031** 0.01
Labour productivity 0.252*** 0.026 0.275*** 0.029 0.246*** 0.029
Capital intensity 0.013* 0.005 0.012* 0.005 0.012* 0.005
Profit margin -0.289*** 0.087 -0.289*** 0.075 -0.289*** 0.075
Cash-flow/control -0.032*** 0.009 -0.032* 0.014 -0.032* 0.014
Own. concentration -0.073** 0.008 -0.072* 0.024 -0.074** 0.026
Regional labour c. 0.834*** 0.185 0.858*** 0.204 0.847*** 0.202
Sector labour c. 0.460*** 0.046 0.461*** 0.051 0.459*** 0.051
Lambda 0.003** 0.001 - - 0.001 0.001
Rho - - 0.387*** 0.085 0.401*** 0.092
n 798  798  798  
Se 0.203  0.160  0.157  
R2 0.603  0.752  0.762  
Adjusted R2 0.595  0.743  0.752  
 
Note: 
*** stat. sign. at the 0.1% level 
**stat. sign. at the 1% level 
*stat. sign. at the 5% level 
Source: KDD, 2010; AJPES PRS, 2011; own calculation 
Although LM tests indicate that spatial error model is a proper specification of the given 
model, we nonetheless estimated the SARAR(1,1) model in order to confirm our previous 
findings. Looking only at the spatial parameters in the SARAR(1,1) model we can see that 
spatial lag is not statistically different from zero. For that reason we excluded it and estimated 
a spatial error model. Comparing results of the OLS model to the spatial error model does not 
reveal any significant changes to the estimates, although adjusted R2 shows a better fit of the 
spatial error model compared to the OLS model. Adjusted R2 in the case of OLS is 0.60 
compared to 0.74 in the spatial error model. This is in line with our expectations, since we 
explicitly try to find ownership based effects in the disturbances. Coefficient of spatial 
autocorrelation of the disturbances, with value of 0.387, reveals positive moderate ownership 
effects on labour costs. Disturbances are not independently and identically distributed but 
exhibit similar values around each individual owner; values of disturbances are dependent on 
the position in the capital space. Since capital connectivity matrix was designed using 
individual ownership shares, this confirms that the identity of owners do matter, at least in the 
case of corporate wage policy in Slovenia.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
This paper introduces the capital space and a capital connectivity matrix to the field of 
corporate governance. Although owners are usually seen as solely seeking highest returns on 
their investments, maximizing profits, it was therefore concluded that ownership is not an 
important factor. In this paper we provided empirical evidence that there is a non-negligible 
effect of ownership on corporate wage policy. We believe that past difficulties in providing 
such empirical evidence lies in the unavailability of detailed ownership structure data and a 
lack of appropriate methods. In this paper we used ownership data on individual level and 
spatial econometric techniques to show that ownership does matter in the case of corporate 
wage setting. It has been found that both ownership concentration and excess of cash-flow 
rights with regards to control rights have a detrimental effect on wages. Not only that, it has 
been found that identity of owners is also an important factor as firms with same owners 
similarly affect average labour costs even after controlling for standard factors such as labour 
productivity, employment, capital intensity and profitability. A surprising finding was a 
relationship between wages and profitability. Results indicate that firms with higher profits 
(ceteris paribus) pay lower wages. We argue that this effect could be explained by highly 
indebted owners, seeking higher returns on their investment by reducing labour costs. 
One limitation needs to be acknowledged and addressed regarding the present study. Using a 
cross-sectional data does not enable us to distinguish between the true effects of the owners 
from their selection. It is possible that individuals invest in firms that reflect some similarities 
in wage levels; hence spatial error might reflect their investment decision patterns and not 
their effects on corporate policies, which is what the further research will reveal. Also, a 
finding that a presence of a specific individual owner in a group of firms shows resemblance 
in their wage levels gives ground to studying effects of ownership on other corporate policies. 
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